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Abstract: 
The United States Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
operates the largest confinement system in the country, no small 
accomplishment in the world’s largest prison system. This article analyzes the 
US immigration detention system as a series of spatial strategies through which 
state officials seek to manage and redirect transboundary migration. I argue that 
while detention works to confine, segregate, and categorize migrant bodies, 
detention is also a performance of state power. As such, it produces effects 
beyond deportation. The article will first outline how immigration detention 
both relies upon and extends the US criminal justice system to open up spaces 
of arbitrary administrative discretion. I then draw on my research on noncitizen 
detention and visitation programs to demonstrate how detention is more than a 
fixing of bodies in space; it is a process of isolation, criminalization, and 
marginalization. I argue that detention cannot be subsumed under or explained 
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by deportation, and that it plays a key role in the production of migrant 
precarity in current US immigration and border control. 
Keywords: Migration, detention, prison, precarity, state power, criminalization, 
USA. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
currently detains an average of 34,000 people each day.  Nominally considered 
a civil detention system, ICE detains noncitizens in approximately 250 facilities 
in all 50 states, making the immigration detention system the largest prison 
system in the country. In addition, noncitizens charged with immigration-
related violations are the fastest-growing group in the federal criminal justice 
system. Violent crime rates have, in contrast, fallen in recent years (US Federal 
Bureau of Investigation 2014), so that immigration-related imprisonment 
represents the most significant growth and change to the US’s prison landscape 
in the last decade. How do we explain this dramatic expansion of the US 
immigration detention system? The US Congress has not been able to pass new 
immigration legislation since 1996, but security and counter-terrorism policies 
have included provisions related to immigration and border enforcement (see 
Martin 2012a for a detailed review). In addition, Congress has provided ICE 
and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) with unprecedented funding to 
expand existing enforcement practices and implement new ones. For example, 
section 287(g) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
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Act (IIRIRA) enabled ICE to sign Memoranda of Agreement (or MOAs) with 
local law enforcement agencies, such as county and city police. These MOAs 
allowed police officers to run immigration checks on people in county and city 
jails and identify people of questionable status to ICE. Immigration officials 
could, if they chose, place a detainer on those people for up to 48 hours, during 
which time they would interview them about immigration status and transfer 
them to an immigration detention facility if deemed necessary (Guttin 2010).  
This program was replaced by the Secure Communities program (SComm) and 
expanded to 3074 (97%) of US counties by July 2012. Running these biometric 
background checks through immigration databases, local police stations now 
filter noncitizens into immigration detention, linking street and federal 
immigration policing in unprecedented ways (Coleman 2009; Varsanyi et al. 
2012).  
 
The federal criminal justice system is also increasingly used to funnel 
noncitizens into the civil immigration system. In a program called Operation 
Streamline, groups of noncitizens are charged with immigration-related crimes, 
usually repeated entry without documents, in federal courts.  As of March 2013, 
immigration-related criminal charges in federal courts rose 22.7% from March 
2012, and 67.8% from 2008 (Transactions Records Access Clearinghouse 
2013a) and now comprise the majority of all criminal cases filed in federal 
courts (Transactions Records Access Clearinghouse 2013b). In Operation 
Streamline trials, migrants are often represented, tried, and sentenced as in 
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groups, and usually given penalties that trigger deportation and a long-term ban 
from lawfully entering the United States. Not only has this raised serious 
concerns about due process of law, but it indicates a linking of federal criminal 
justice and immigration systems in strategic ways. County jails and federal 
courts work to move noncitizens through criminal justice processes into 
immigration detention and, ICE hopes, to deportation. Imprisonment and 
detention, while technically distinct, have become linked together through 
administrative and legal processes, working to isolate, contain, and move 
noncitizens between legal systems and between countries.   
 
The size and scope of the US immigration detention system makes it globally 
and geopolitically significant, especially effecting countries in Central America 
and East Asia with whom the US has a long geopolitical and economic history. 
But immigration detention should not be so easily understood as an 
exceptionally American problem, as EU’s FRONTEX regularly invites experts 
from US border and immigration agencies to provide guidance to European 
policy makers, and companies deriving expertise from US contracts consult 
with European, African, and Asian governments, as well. While a detailed 
comparison of national detention regimes is beyond the purview of this paper 
(but see Wilsher 2012), this paper seeks to draw some conceptual entry points 
from the US case for such future work. In particular, I argue that immigration 
detention contributes to migrant precarity in specific ways, through processes of 
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isolation, the linking of criminal justice and immigration systems, and the high 
cost--financial and emotional--of detention and deportation. 
 
This article describes how imprisonment has become a core spatial strategy in 
the US’s immigration enforcement system. While imprisonment has often been 
conceptualized as a form of containment, I will show how immigration 
detention seeks to redirect transboundary migrants and asylum seekers, to deter 
potential migrants and asylum-seekers, and to forcibly remove certain kinds of 
noncitizens from the United States. As Dominique Moran (2013b) has argued, 
imprisonment relies upon specific forms of mobility and the circulation of 
people, goods, and money between “inside” and “outside.” For immigration 
scholars, detention’s primary role is often understood to be the enforcement of 
deportation, a form of forced mobility. Yet for many, detention is part of the 
admission or entry process.  For asylum-seekers claiming asylum at a Port of 
Entry, which is within their legal rights under international and US law, 
government suspicion and immediate detention are the first steps in their 
admission to the United States. Many detained noncitizens have claims to relief 
under current immigration law, as well.  Subsuming detention under 
deportation accepts US Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s representation 
of detention as a necessary step to enforce immigration law, and misses the 
wider context in which immigration detention both emerged and continues to 
operate. Moreover, explaining the detention system as a function of deportation 
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policies neglects two key elements: the relationship between immigration 
detention and the US prison system, and the production of migrant precarity.  
 
In the following sections, I contextualize US immigration detention in a broader 
political economy of imprisonment and show how detention is a spatial strategy 
of forced mobility that contributes to the production of specific forms of 
precarity for noncitizens living and working in the United States. To understand 
how these practices work together to produce migrant precarity, I draw from 
primary research (interviews, legal and policy documents, participant 
observation) on immigrant family detention between 2008 and 2011, interviews 
and participant observation with visitation program participants in 2011, and 
human rights organization reports on Operation Streamline. No single strategy 
criminalizes noncitizens; detention itself combines multiple spatial strategies. 
Detention is, however, one policy embedded in a wider immigration 
enforcement complex that increasingly uses criminal prosecution to achieve 
long-term imprisonment, following by detention and permanent banishment 
from the United States. As the European Union, Australia, and other regions 
expand detention as a strategy of immigration and border control, this analysis 
provides conceptual and empirical entry points for unpacking detention’s 
spatialities.  
 
1. Conceptualizing detention’s spatial practices and the production of 
migrant precarity 
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To understand immigration detention’s spatiality, we must ask what work 
detention performs, through what spatial orderings, networks, and relationships, 
and for whom. Detention is a particularly spatial practice that bounds space in 
order to prevent bodily mobility (Martin and Mitchelson 2009). Analyzing how 
and why detention works requires different analytical starting points, however, 
because official policy rationales for detention do not explain its effects on 
those detained, nor do they adequately account for the mundane practices of 
detention center staff, deportation officers, and migrants themselves. Despite 
the oft-cited divergence between “policy” and “practice,” policy discourses 
create the conditions of possibility for particular forms of detention. In the case 
of US immigration law, the specific legal categories of administrative and 
prosecutorial discretion open up legalized space of action for immigration 
policy-makers and deportation officers that cannot be challenged in courts. This 
allows detention center staff and local ICE employees a wide bandwidth of 
decision-making, a situation that has produced a wide range of practices within 
and between detention centers (see also Gill 2009 for similar findings in the UK 
context). In other words, US immigration law and policy authorizes 
immigration policymakers and officers to make a wide range of decisions about 
individual cases and constrains migrants’ access to legal processes. To 
understand this variability in everyday practice, then, one must understand the 
legal discourses that authorize ICE to detain and deport migrants through a 
separate legal system unbeholden to Constitutional norms and procedures.  
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For this reason, Alison Mountz, et al. (2012) argue that “detention can be 
conceptualized as a series of processes; and that operating through these 
processes are a set of temporal and spatial logics that structure the seemingly 
paradoxical geographies of detention” (2012, 3). In particular, they argue that 
contemporary migrant detention practices work through intertwined logics of 
bordering/exclusion and mobility/containment. Detention centers perform many 
functions (inspection, identity verification, court rulings) that have traditionally 
been located at border checkpoints. By reconfiguring the geography of 
bordering practices, detention practices reterritorialize national borders, 
externalizing them and bringing them into the interior in different contexts 
(Coleman 2007). In addition, the forced mobility of deportation reaffirms 
national identity through the process of repatriation. Detention centers are very 
often remotely located, so that distance works as a spatial strategy of 
containment. This “exclusion by geographical design” (Mountz 2010) includes, 
however, other forms of circulation and forced mobility, as immigration 
authorities transfer migrants between facilities. As Nick Gill (2009) has shown, 
transfers are used to penalize detained migrants for political actions and prevent 
detained people from forming bonds with other detainees, service 
organizations, or case workers. Moran et al. (2012) call this “disciplined 
mobility,” and they argue that transfers and intra-facility transportation is a key 
part of the subjectification process for those who are confined.  While these 
processes unfold through distinct embodied practices, they work together to 
associate noncitizens with prison, criminality, and illegality.  
9 
 
 
For Moran (2013a, b), tensions between mobility and confinement characterize 
“the carceral” more broadly. For her, the carceral is more than the space in 
which people are detained.  Rather, detention centers and prisons are a locus of 
a carceral continuum and a site from which secondary incarceration or 
collateral effects of imprisonment emanate (Moran 2013b). In other words, 
detention centers and prisons may bundle the spatial practices of confinement 
into a spectacular display of states’ power to control bodies, but these spatial 
practices are mobilized beyond prisons, as well (as Michel Foucault concludes, 
Foucault 1990). Moreover, detention’s apparent boundedness masks the 
continual exchange between “inside” and “outside,” particularly the “collateral 
effects” of imprisonment on families and communities of those inside (Moran 
2013 GeoJournal). As Gill (2009) has argued, transfers have the intended effect 
of sanctioning migrants organizing within detention centers, and they also limit 
asylum organizations’ ability and desire to provide aid to detained people. 
Thus, spatial practices of disciplined mobility undermine the affective and 
emotional ties between detained people and family, friends, and support 
networks who might aid them.  
 
Detention’s disciplinarity works not only through confinement and forced 
mobility, but by bearing down on networks of care through which detained 
migrants support themselves (Martin 2011, 2012b). This is true in both sending 
and receiving countries. Nancy Hiemstra (2012) has found the process to have 
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dramatic effects on sending communities in Ecuador. The loss of income, 
savings, and material possessions in the US, combined with the lack of 
knowledge about where loved ones are located, have significant impacts on the 
physical and mental health of detained workers’ families. For those detained, 
the uncertainty of transfers and eventual deportation feel like “chaotic 
geographies” and produces a disorder that conceals the multiple interests at 
work in the immigration enforcement system (Hiemstra 2013). As a deterrence 
policy, immigration enforcement practices are engineered to alter migrants’ 
cost-benefit calculations (Martin 2012b), and yet the precarity of life at home 
encourages them to continue to migrate (Hiemstra 2012). In addition, the 
stigma of detention and deportation stay with migrants as they attempt to 
reintegrate “at home.” This has been a particular problem for Central American 
youths deported through anti-gang strategies, as many of them are either 
directly imprisoned upon return or become targets for vigilantes and other 
gangs (Zilberg 2010). As a result, deportees live highly circumscribed lives, 
moving around as little as possible to avoid confrontation. Detention’s 
carcerality reverberates through families’ lives, in the US and abroad, and 
through daily life after detention. 
 
In sum, detention is not a single spatial strategy or practice, nor is its spatiality 
confined to the detention center itself. What these geographic studies of US 
immigration enforcement show is that detention is a lived process and a bundle 
of textual and embodied practices meted out through everyday enactments. 
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These practices amount to what Mathew Coleman and Austin Kocher (2011) 
call “migrant incapacitation.”  Specifically, they “bring the threat of deportation 
into the most intimate recesses of immigrant life,” so that migrants are “forced 
to engage in increasingly tenuous underground means of social reproduction in 
a society in which they nevertheless labour openly” (Coleman and Kocher 
2011, p. 235). Migrant incapacitation is, then, a form of social control, in which 
some are deported so that others may remain (deGenova 2002). The threat of 
detention and deportation discourages labor organizing, complaints, and 
demands for legitimate pay, resulting in a docile working class that very much 
serves labor market needs for cheap, temporary labor (de Genova 2002; 
Harrison and Lloyd 2012; McLaughlin and Hennebry forthcoming). Detention 
and deportation work, in sum, to make an already precarious migrant life more 
precarious.  
 
I want to expand on the connections between precarity, detention, and 
imprisonment. Coleman and Kocher’s concept of migrant incapacitation builds 
upon Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s (2007) analysis of California’s prison system, in 
which she connects the rise of mass incarceration to urban deindustrialization 
and rural agricultural crises. She traces how deindustrialization in California’s 
urban cores produced a wageless working class, at the same time that the 
restructuring of the agricultural economy created unemployment in rural areas. 
In Chicago, Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore (2008) have shown that 
imprisonment has dramatic effects on the urban labor market in these 
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deindustrialized areas. As working-age people face few job prospects and find 
themselves imprisoned for engaging in illicit activities, those neighborhoods 
find themselves without their key wage-earning demographic. When people 
return to those neighborhoods after prison, they face even fewer prospects for 
legitimate employment, as few workplaces will hire those with criminal 
records. This produces a “churn” of people into and out of prisons and low-
wage urban labor markets. Specific legal tactics have led to this situation in 
many states, namely the rise of mandatory sentencing and zero-tolerance laws 
that mandate long prison sentences for non-violent crimes. Broadly speaking, 
these studies show how mass imprisonment both relies upon and reproduces 
specific forms of precarious labor and household livelihoods. In a similar 
fashion, Joseph Nevins (2007) argues that current US immigration enforcement 
is bound up with a political economy that reaches back in time and beyond US 
boundaries. In particular, he traces how the deregulation of agricultural exports 
in Central America undermined smallholder farmers’ ability to live off coffee 
cultivation. As a result, farmers moved to cities and eventually to the United 
States. The production of an “immigration crisis” stemmed from, Nevins 
argues, the political economy of global agricultural trade, urban employment, 
transboundary migration. Thus, analyses of immigration enforcement practices, 
including detention, must take these successive structural changes into account.  
 
To this end, I trace detention’s spatial practies to understand how US 
immigration detention policies contribute to the production of migrant 
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precarity. In particular, I show how immigration detention policies rely upon 
the US criminal justice system in specific ways, and I highlight how the 
criminalization of immigration has produced new forms of imprisonment. I then 
turn to specific spatial strategies of mobility control within the immigration 
detention system, and analyze the ways in which they destabilize networks of 
care. On the basis of this analysis, I return to the concept of precarity, and 
discuss how we can pry apart distinct, but intersecting, forms of precarious life 
in immigration detention.  
 
2. Criminalization, illegalization, and disciplined mobility in US 
immigration detention 
Traditionally, the US criminal justice and immigration systems have been 
separate systems, the former being a system for adjudicating criminal law and 
the latter being a civil administrative process of admission, entry, and 
repatriation for noncitizens. In the last few years, new programs have brought 
these systems into direct contact, so that jails and federal prisons now serve to 
channel noncitizens into detention and, ICE presumes, deportation. These legal 
techniques build upon a shared infrastructure, however, in which growing 
immigration detention demands soaked up surplus prison space. In this section, 
I trace out these interconnections to better locate immigration detention in the 
“technical landscapes of social control” (Paasi 2009) supported by the criminal 
justice system. 
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2.1 Joining Criminal Justice and Immigration Detention 
As of 2007, the United States imprisoned 2.39 million people in federal and 
state prisons and county jails, up from 1.29 million in 1992; per capita, the rate 
of incarceration rose from 501 to 758 per 100,000 residents (International 
Center for Prison Studies 2010). The US immigration detention system grew 
even more dramatically over the same period. In 1994, 6785 detention beds 
were used for noncitizens in civil immigration proceedings, which grew to 
9,011 beds in 1996, 19,485 beds in 2000, and 33,400 in 2011 (Haddal and 
Siskin 2010, p. 12). Paradoxically, the crime rate leveled in 1980 and has 
subsequently dropped, but new approaches to mandatory sentencing, which 
limited judges discretion to release those convicted of drug and other 
nonviolent offenses, swelled the prisoner population (Gilmore 2007). This 
limitation of judicial discretion was expanded to the immigration system in 
1996 when the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA) came into effect. Side by side, these statistics appear to portray two 
growing confinement systems, which is often understood as a particularly 
American penchant for punitive responses to social problems and immigration 
policy.  
 
What these statistics mask, however, are important regional differences in 
prison and detention expansion. As Ruth Gilmore (2007) describes, California 
was home to a particularly enthusiastic round of prison building in the 1980s 
and 1990s, where the prisoner population grew 500% between 1982 and 2000. 
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In Texas, a similar trend unfolded, but where California’s expanded system 
remained publically owned, Texas’ expansion relied heavily upon private 
prison corporations to build and operate its new prisons. As incarceration rates 
began to stabilize in the early 2000s, speculative private prison building 
(building before contracts to house prisoners were obtained) resulted in the 
overproduction of prison space around the United States. In many cases, these 
small-town prisons were built with public financing but were to be managed 
and operated by private companies (Perkinson 2010). When they remained 
empty, the produced significant financial burdens on already-struggling towns, 
and created pressures for new prisoners or detainees (e.g., Bonds 2009). For 
companies that owned facilities, this shift left companies like the Corrections 
Corporation of America (CCA) on the verge of bankruptcy in 2003.   
 
In 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was formed, 
reorganizing 26 agencies including immigration, border, and citizenship 
administrations. With unprecedented levels of funding earmarked for 
immigration, border, and counter-terrorism, immigration enforcement officials 
were able to apprehend, detain, and deport more noncitizens than before. As 
stated above, IIRIRA limited judicial discretion over immigration decisions, 
and it did so by mandating detention for noncitizens (documented or 
undocumented) with records of “aggravated felonies.” In addition, IIRIRA 
expanded the range of deportable offenses. For some, this punitive approach to 
immigration indicates a “criminalization of immigration,” and the use of 
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detention and deportation as a form of social control (Coleman 2007, de 
Genova 2002). As Teresa Miller (2003) has noted, however, the coupling of 
expanded administrative powers and the limitation of judicial discretion was 
common in the criminal justice system, as well. Parole boards, for example, 
decide how long prisoners will serve and decisions cannot be appealed to 
judges. For Miller, this expanded space of administrative decision-making, 
outside the court system, constitutes an “immigrationization of criminal 
justice.” That is, legal techniques developed in the immigration and criminal 
justice fields have been transferred to the other, in most cases rolling back 
rights and protections for the incarcerated. 
 
In 2004 and 2005, the then-new ICE agencies changed mandatory detention 
rules, dubiously called “Catch and Remove” in reference to wildlife hunting, so 
that anyone caught within two-weeks of arrival and 100 miles of the US-
Mexico border could be processed through the Expedited Removal program. 
Previously, this program was reserved for unauthorized border-crossers at ports 
of entry. Expedited Removal processing necessarily leads to detention, and it 
authorizes ICE officers to order deportation without migrants’ seeing a 
immigration judge. Thus, Expedited Removal’s expansion drew new groups of 
migrants into the detention system, and created the demand for more beds.  ICE 
met this demand by contracting with a few key actors: private prison companies 
with empty facilities and county jails with empty beds. At its peak, the 
immigration detention system included over 300 facilities, and 240 of these  
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were mixed population jails and prisons, where immigration detainees were 
housed alongside pre-trial detainees and people doing time in the criminal 
justice system (Schriro 2009, p. 10). In some cases, counties leased beds to ICE 
at far above their daily cost, using immigration detainees to draw funding into 
flagging county jails. An internal report on the detention system found many of 
these facilities to be inappropriate for detainees, and the number of detention 
centers has since shrunk to around 250.  While this relationship between 
immigration detention and county-level imprisonment has been reigned in to 
some extent, ICE has implemented a new policy that links the two systems in 
important ways.  
 
The Secure Communities program, or SComm, requires police officers in 
almost all counties in the US to run noncitizens’ fingerprints through 
immigration databases (US ICE 2012a). The current procedures work in tandem 
with Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) database checks, so that the FBI 
forwards noncitizen fingerprint information to DHS. If DHS finds a match with 
fingerprints in its database, it places a “detainer” on the noncitizen in question. 
The detainer requires local jails to keep people for an additional 48 hours for 
ICE interview. If, at the end of 48 hours, ICE does perform the interview, the 
person is released through normal bond or parole procedures (if applicable). 
Depending on the situation, the person may be charged and tried for the original 
arrest. If convicted, s/he serves time and is then transferred to ICE detention, 
where ICE will begin deportation proceedings. If the county does not charge the 
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noncitizen in question (in which case s/he would normally return to the 
community), ICE can still detain her/him for immigration violations. Since 
2010, ICE has claimed that it uses a priority system for detention and 
deportation, which would allow those without charges--or with low-level 
charges--to be released (US ICE 2010). But the implementation of these 
policies has not been seen to bear out in practice (Transactions Records Access 
Clearinghouse 2013c).  Thus, SComm uses the other policing practices to 
funnel noncitizens into the immigration detention system, expanding the points 
of contact between ICE and noncitizens in everyday life. More importantly, it 
normalizes the link between criminality and immigration enforcement as a 
matter of procedure. 
 
At the same time that Expedited Removal was expanded to “close loopholes” of 
who could be detained and where, ICE also explicitly criminalized immigration 
violations. Operation Streamline is a program of automatic prosecution of 
unauthorized border crossers along the US-Mexico boundary. The program was 
initiated in 2005 as part of a wider effort to detain “Other than Mexicans” or 
(OTMs) caught crossing the border without authorization who could not be 
immediately returned to their countries of origin. (Mexicans caught at the 
border were immediately returned to Mexico). These migrants were most often 
released upon recognizance, a policy dubiously referred to as “Catch and 
Release” (see Martin 2012 on broader efforts to detain OTMs). Prior to 
Operation Streamline, the US Attorney’s Office retained discretion to prosecute 
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(or not) unauthorized border crossers, and reserved federal criminal prosecution 
for repeat offenders and those with significant criminal records. Streamline, 
however, requires federal prosecutors to charge and try unauthorized 
noncitizens for migration-related violations in federal criminal courts.  Reports 
describe Streamline trials as processes in which 10 to 70 noncitizens can be 
prosecuted at once, and procedures differ by federal court judge. Operation 
Streamline trials utilize and expedited process that combines arraignment, plea 
and sentencing hearings. Noncitizens are given a maximum of one hour to meet 
with legal counsel prior to appearing in court. During their court appearance, 
the judge asks them if they are citizens of Mexico, if they have papers allowing 
them to enter the US, and if they entered the US without authorization. 
Sometimes the judge asks people individually and sometimes as a group 
(Lydgate 2010; Grassroots Leadership 2012; Borderlands Autonomous 
Collective 2012). These conditions mean that noncitizens are not afforded 
individual due process in their criminal trials, but are presumed to be guilty by 
group membership. 
  
Operation Streamline “closes the loophole” available to OTMs in two ways. 
First, the program moves migrants that do not qualify for IIRIRA’s mandatory 
detention to the federal criminal justice system, where they will be confined in 
the pre-trial custody system (many of them not having the resources for bond). 
Second, criminal prosecutions and prison terms place noncitizens in IIRIRA’s 
“aggravated felony” category, making them not only deportable, but subject to 
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mandatory detention upon completing their sentences. For those charged with 
“reentry of deported alien” (08 USC 1326), conviction triggers a 10 year ban on 
entering the United States. The consequences of this shift have been clear. The 
total federal court caseload has risen 31.8% since 2008, and immigration-
related charges now comprise around 57% of all prosecutions in the federal 
courts. DHS, which includes ICE and CBP, refers 64% of all federal 
prosecutions across the country (TRAC 2013b).  As many critics have noted, 
the quick increase in caseloads have led to serious concerns over the process 
itself, as immigrants are charged, tried, and sentenced in groups of up to 80 
people (Lydgate 2010).  
 
While some noncitizens enter the federal prison system for long term sentences, 
the majority are incarcerated in Criminal Alien Requirement facilities that  hold 
exclusively noncitizens.  Much of this dedicated bedspace has been provided by 
private prison companies. These facilities do not provide services or family 
support equal to the rest of the federal prison system, and noncitizens are 
categorically excluded from minimum-security facilities and drug rehabilitation 
(Robertson et al., 2012). Thus, the apparent advantages of the criminal justice 
system over the civil immigration system (such as the right to a lawyer and due 
process protections) are systematically eroded for noncitizens in the federal 
criminal justice system.   
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The criminalization of immigration is not, then, solely symbolic, rather the civil 
immigration system and criminal justice systems have intersected in specific 
ways. In particular, the two systems share legal techniques, such as expanded 
administrative discretion to detain and release, facilities, and databases. And 
yet, federal criminal prosecution of immigration-related violations has led not 
to the incorporation of immigration into that system, but to the creation of a 
separate set of procedures and facilities within the criminal justice system. 
Operation Streamline uses highly questionable “due process” to classify 
noncitizens as aggravated felons, funneling them into mandatory detention and, 
subsequently, deportation. Without becoming one system, immigration and 
criminal justice procedures have been linked in strategic ways. Here, I want to 
focus on the spatial practices of detention, in particular, to highlight the ways in 
which the spatiality of confinement is deployed to policy transboundary 
mobility. 
 
2.2 Disciplined Mobility in Detention 
All US immigration detention centers are secure facilities. Detainee mobility is 
highly constrained within the centers, and visitation is closely regulated. 
Detained noncitizen adults are issued uniforms and are sorted into facilities’ 
low, medium, and high security zones, demarcated by the color of their 
jumpsuits. Movement between areas of the detention center is highly 
controlled. In facilities that have multiple security levels, detainees of different 
security levels must remain in their cells while other groups move through the 
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facility, be it for visitation, meals, or transport. This means that detainees can 
spend long periods confined to their cells during the day, regardless of their 
security level. Solitary confinement is widely used to both “protect” vulnerable 
people, such as gay, lesbian, and transgender people, and to discipline political 
organizers within detention centers. A few centers have relatively freer internal 
mobility inside the centers, such as the Berks County Family Care Shelter and 
T. Don Hutto Detention center, because they were designed to detain families. 
In these cases, however, zones of less-restricted mobility are nested within 
securitized boundaries that are fenced and patrolled (Martin 2012b).  In their 
internal spatial orderings, immigration detention centers operate very much like 
their counterparts in the criminal justice system. A key difference, however, is 
that immigration detention is indefinite in the United States. This sense of 
indeterminacy has dramatic effects on detained persons’ mental health, as well 
as their families’.  
 
Long-distance transfers have also been common. In 2007 and 2008, ICE 
transferred over 50% of detained adults at least once, and over 20% twice or 
more (TRAC 2008). Detainees are often transferred without notice, and until 
the Online Detainee Locator System was implemented in 2010, it was common 
to lose track of detainees for days after their transfer (Hiemstra 2013).  
Moreover, visitation policies have been set by detention center operators, and 
the identification requirements, hours, dress codes, and other regulations varied 
widely between facilities. For detainees in county jails, visitation follows the 
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facility policy, and visitors often speak to detained noncitizens through 
plexiglass barriers. Detained migrants and their families experience these visits 
as criminalizing, and in some cases detainees prefer their families not to visit 
(Martin 2011, 2012). The association of detention with prisons with criminality 
creates a powerful series of “collateral effects” (Moran 2013b) on family 
members in the US and abroad and on government agents and non-
governmental service organizations (Gill 2009), as described above.  
 
2.3 “Alternatives to Detention” 
In addition to secured facilities, ICE retains custody over more than 17,000 
noncitizens through Alternatives to Detention (ATD) programs, which include 
a combination of electronic monitoring (gps ankle bracelet), in-person and 
phone reporting, unannounced visits from immigration staff, curfews, and court 
appearance requirements. ICE contracts with BI Incorporated, owned by the 
private prison company GEO Group who also operates detention centers 
(Human Rights First 2013), to run two Intensive Supervision Appearance 
programs. “Full-service ISAP” includes case management, in which BI 
caseworkers give noncitizens information about local services. As critics have 
pointed out, they do not provide sufficient individual needs analysis, nor do 
they connect noncitizens with service organizations themselves (see Lutheran 
Immigrant and Refugee Services 2012, p. 31). “Technology-assisted ISAP” 
utilizes BI’s electronic monitors, while ICE retains direct supervision of 
noncitizens. Notably, migrants are eligible for full-service ISAP if they live 
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within 50-85 miles of 30 ICE offices, while technology-assisted ISAP is 
available at all ICE offices.  
 
These ATD programs allow noncitizens to avoid confinement, but restrict 
mobility within their communities (Martin 2012b). For example, ankle monitors 
must be charged and this requires ATD participants to sit near an electrical 
socket for period of time each day. The bracelets are difficult to shower with, 
and pregnant women find them painful when their ankle swell. Others have 
reported stigmatization in their neighborhood because the monitors are the 
same type as those used in the criminal justice system. The existence of the 
monitor implies criminality, despite the fact that ICE uses them with 
populations who cannot be detained in secure facilities.
1
 Furthermore, ICE uses 
ATD programs for noncitizens that are ineligible for detention, such as mothers 
with dependent children and asylum seekers, drawing more noncitizens into 
ICE custody rather than replacing detention beds (Lutheran Immigrant and 
Refugee Services 2012).  ATD programs have, in effect, widened ICE 
surveillance over noncitizens in their own communities.  
 
Conclusion: detention and the production of precariousness 
From local policing to deportation and return, detention practices work through 
a wide range of spatial relationships. For noncitizen communities and their 
                                               
1
 It should be noted that this practice is widely criticized as “net-widening” because it brings 
people into custody who should be released without supervision. See Lutheran Immigrant and 
Refugee Services 2012. 
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allies in the US, these have accumulated into a sense of siege. As Luis 
Fernandez writes,  
...we can see that the strategy is to target all those things that make 
undocumented life possible: work, education, family life, health care, 
home, etc. The tactic of ‘enforcement through attrition,’ then, targets the 
essence of undocumented life, making it very difficult for 
undocumented people to meet their needs....So you begin to see the 
closing of all the possibilities of what it means to become an 
undocumented person. (Loyd 2012, p. 230) 
US immigration detention practices are not a single strategy, as demonstrated 
above, but are nested within an institutional assemblage of legal tactics and 
procedures, transportation networks, and prison infrastructure. Immigration and 
criminal justice systems now link up with each other in ways that have changed 
the legal operation of immigration enforcement. In effect, Secure Communities 
and Operation Streamline work to illegalize noncitizens, to channel them into a 
system that will ban them from authorized presence for a decade. Detention 
centers, in turn, work to segregate noncitizen populations, to isolate them for 
inspection, and in doing so create the sense that they are a criminal population.  
For those detained and their families and communities outside, imprisonment 
and detention produce significant strains, both financially and emotionally. 
While deportation prevents the same kind of “churn” between disinvested areas 
and prisons that Peck and Theodore observe, immigration enforcement’s spatial 
tactics contribute to making work and daily life uncertain, anxious, and 
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precarious. Here I want to think more deeply about migrant precarity, to offer a 
way of prying apart the specific spatial practices that contribute to its 
production and how to politicize it. 
 
For Judith Butler (2009), precarity is more than an issue of work conditions or 
legal status, rather these are functions of a deeper ontological condition. Butler 
distinguishes between a socio-politically produced precarity and ontological 
precariousness, the fundamentally social interdependence of being human. In 
her words, “precarity designates that politically induced condition in which 
certain populations suffer from failing social and economic networks of support 
and become differentially exposed to injury, violence, and death” (Butler 2009, 
p. 25) while “precariousness implies living socially, that is, the fact that one’s 
life is always in some sense in the hands of the other” (ibid., p. 14).  Her goal is 
to provide philosophical grounding for a material critique of state violence, of 
the ways in which policies and categories make life unlivable. Butler’s call 
emerges from and resonates with wider field of scholarship interrogating the 
regulation of life and intimacy, especially feminist theorizations of care and 
Foucauldian analyses of biopower. Seeking to think through the spatiality of 
Butler’s approach, Harker argues that her “spatialized social ontology helps 
conceptualize how subjects are differentially exposed to precarity and the social 
work done by families (and other more-than-individual subjects) to sustain life 
in conditions of heightened exposure to violence, injury, and death” (2012, p. 
861). For my purposes here, tracing intimate, familial, and affective relations--
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and the ways in which these relations are exploited or rendered by state 
policies--provides a starting point for analyzing how immigration detention 
works across different spatial registers: bodies, intimacies, homes, legal cases, 
nation-state boundaries, everyday mobilities.   
 
Building on Butler and Harker, I argue that immigration detention’s specific 
spatiality produces migrant precarity by successively criminalizing, illegalizing, 
and forcibly remobilizing noncitizens.  These practices exploit life’s 
precariousness, in Butler’s ontological sense, because they seek to make 
immigrant life unlivable, to undermine the relations of care through which 
people sustain themselves. Detention and imprisonment make visible the ways 
in which precariousness is produced by the spatial exploitation of our 
interdependence. Desires to earn a sufficient living, provide opportunities for 
children, or find safe haven are strategies to address life’s inherent precarity by 
shoring up one’s ability to provide opportunities for loved ones.  While 
temporary work programs make use of this need for income to keep work 
dangerous and low-paying, immigration enforcement policies disrupt and 
reconfigure the intimate relationships on which people depend. Detention and 
prison systems may be legally distinct, but their shared spatialities of controlled 
mobility and isolation bear down on networks of care in much the same ways. 
As policies like Operation Streamline and Secure Communities make the link 
between those two confinement systems explicit, scholars and organizers alike 
must continue to attend to the common ways in which these confinement 
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regimes magnify ontological precarity through legal, political, economic, and 
social exclusion. 
 
Butler would like us to go further, however. Analyzing precariousness’ 
geographies should do more than liberal calls for equal individual rights, better 
representative processes, and better inclusion in society.  Rather, the aim is to 
analyze how immigration (and military, border policing, and social) policies 
“maximize precariousness for others while minimizing precariousness for the 
power in question” (Butler 2009, p. 25), what has also been called “the 
geopolitics of vulnerability” (Martin 2011). In other words, the point is that 
these inequalities are strategically institutionalized and reproduced. The 
production of racialized inequality, in particular, has been a key part of the 
development of modern nation-states and biopolitical population management 
practices (see Foucault 1990, p. 149). Moreover, managing intimacy--sexual 
and familial--has long been a key component of social policy. The shift from 
social welfare policies to incapacitation and imprisonment in the US and 
elsewhere has shifted the burden of rehabilitation at the same time that social 
support for families has diminished. These policy changes sharpen previously 
existing inequalities, and as Gilmore (2007) has shown, these processes congeal 
in the prison sector, as urban and rural surplus labor meet in rural prison towns. 
Butler’s challenge to immigrant and human rights advocates is to enact a 
political beyond liberal individualism, which mystifies life’s inherent 
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interdependencies, and to enact a politics rooted in a recognition of the 
intimacy, care, and mutual aid. 
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